understanding what causes behavior to occur in a more In the 1650s, Blaise Pascal puzzled over one of the most proximal sense. Neurobiologists seek to understand the complicated decisions faced by enlightenment philosomechanistic cellular processes by which the brain prophers: "Either God is or he is not," he wrote. "But to duces specific behavioral acts. They seek to understand which view shall we be inclined?" Pascal took what how a cue light causes a rat to press a lever for food was then a completely novel approach to this problem, or how a visual target presented to a monkey elicits arguing that one should "weigh up the gain and loss an eye movement; neurophysiologists have sought to involved in calling heads that God exists" or tails that understand what causes a behavior by studying the he does not (Pascal, 1670).
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sensory-motor architecture of the brain. Over the ensuing three centuries, Pascal's notion that The existence of these parallel approaches to ungain and uncertainty must interact whenever rational derstanding behavior raises an interesting and often decision making occurs has become the foundation for overlooked question. What is the relationship between all rigorous analysis of human choice behavior. Modern ultimate and proximal causation in behavior? While evoeconomic theory rests almost entirely upon this idea. lution may shape behaviors toward efficient forms, the Some thinkers, however, have criticized Pascal's apspecific environmental variables which guide evolution proach, and in particular its use to characterize financial may not be represented explicitly by the neural architecdecision making, as unsystematic. These scientists ture evolution produces. There may be little reason to have noted that while uncertainty can be rigorously believe that the computations which influence fitness at quantified with tools like Bayesian Estimation, underan evolutionary level are echoed by the computations standing the subjective value of a financial gain or a made within the brains of individual animals. In the last loss in mathematical terms may be impossible (for a decade, however, evidence has been accumulating that review of these criticisms, see Glimcher, 2003) . Rethe brains of complex animals like mammals perform cently, however, a group of biologists has argued that operations which closely correspond to the optimization economic approaches applied to biological questions problems behavioral ecologists describe as the ultimate might overcome this limitation by relying on an alternacauses of behavior. These data suggest that the environtive system of valuation rooted in evolutionary theory. mental problems animals face may shape not only be-"Paradoxically," John Maynard Smith wrote in 1982, "it havior but also the neural hardware that generates that has turned out that game theory [a branch of modern behavior. If this is widely true, then it may be of tremeneconomic theory] is more readily applied to biology than dous importance to neurophysiologists. The studies of to the field of economic behavior for which it was origibehavioral ecologists may define the computations performed by the primate neurophysiological architecture for decision making just as mathematical studies of im-age encoding shaped our understanding of sensory enThe Prey Model coding in the last century. This article reviews some of The first step in looking for food is to begin searching; the growing evidence that economic analyses of behavdefined as any activity that takes time and during which ior may provide neurobiologists with critical information, the forager may encounter prey. The goal of the model is to characterize the decisionthat whenever an animal must make a decision about making phase, for which the animal must know (1) the what food to eat it faces an optimization problem that energy gained from prey of each type, (2) the average can be quantified and solved in economic terms. Evoluhandling time required to catch and consume the prey, tion, they suggested, could be viewed as a force that (3) the cost, in energy spent, of the handling process, might well drive organisms not just to solve these proband (4) the rate, in encounters per unit time, at which a lems but to solve them efficiently. "There is a close prey of each type is detected. parallel between the development of theories in ecoWe can characterize the rate of net energy intake nomics and population biology. In biology, however, the in any environment and for any possible prey attack geometry of the organisms and their environment plays strategy in the following way. First, we determine the a greater role. Different phenotypes have different abiliprofitability of each prey type by multiplying the probaties at harvesting resources, and the resources are disbility that the forager will attack that prey type, P (the tributed in a patchwork in three dimensions in the envivariable controlled by the forager), by the frequency with ronment. In this paper we undertake to determine in which that prey is encountered, , to determine how which patches a species would feed and which items often an attack occurs. Then multiply that frequency by would form its diet if the species acted in the most the net energy gained from the prey. (The value of the economical fashion. Hopefully, natural selection will ofprey minus the energy lost during handling.) This calcuten have achieved such optimal allocation of time and lation tells us how much energy the forager can expect energy expenditures, but such 'optimum theories' are to gain (per unit time) for adopting this probability of hypotheses for testing rather than anything certain" attack with this particular type of prey. (MacArthur and Pianka, 1966).
The area of behavioral ecology which developed diaverage gain per prey type per unit time rectly from these two papers, foraging theory, has made ϭ P ϫ ϫ (energy gained Ϫ energy lost) (1) significant advances since 1966, and today, at least six independent optimization problems have been identiNext, one needs to know the cost of attacking each type fied, modeled, and tested. One class of foraging problem of prey in terms of time diverted away from searching that has received significant attention, and one of particfor other, potentially better, prey items. Multiply the ular relevance to neurobiologists, is the study of Prey probability of an attack by the frequency of an encounter Selection. As a monkey roams the savannah, it encounand by the total handling time for that prey type. ters patches of food of different types and qualities, each with a different frequency. Each food type, a plant average handling time per prey type with nutritious roots, a colony of insects, or a piece of fruit, occurs with a certain probability and a certain calo-ϭ P ϫ ϫ (handling time) (2) ric density. Each takes a different amount of time and Finally, one sums the first calculation across every posenergy to obtain and consume, and so each has a differsible prey type and multiplies it by the total time spent ent value, or profitability, to the monkey. What happens searching, then subtracts from that the total cost of when a monkey like this encounters eight food patches, searching, s, and divides the sum by the time spent each with a different set of sensory properties? Those sensory properties allow the animal to estimate the value searching plus handling, yielding a measure of how of each patch, the cost of harvesting each patch, and much energy is gained, for a given set of attack stratethe frequency with which a patch of that type is encoungies, per unit time. tered. Prey selection models use these variables to predict which patch, if any, the monkey will attempt to R these trials, they found that each neuron was most active before a movement in a particular direction, that neuron's best movement. Taking into account both the bepredation, a behavioral pattern toward which evolution havioral and neurophysiological data, trials could be is presumed to drive real species. subdivided into those in which the movement acquiring Neurophysiological Studies of Decision Making the oddball was the best movement for the neuron being While neurophysiologists have started to examine the studied and those trials on which the oddball elicited a proximal causes of behaviors very much like those prodifferent movement. duced by a foraging monkey, they have tended to focus Schall found that FEF neurons ( Figure 2 ) rose to an almost exclusively on the neural pathways that link senearly peak firing rate shortly after stimulus onset, but sory stimuli, like the color of a food patch, with moveonly after about 80 ms was there evidence, in these ment control pathways, like those that activate the musneurons, of an underlying decision process. At that cles of the arm. Very little attention has been paid to point, neuronal firing rates continued to grow if the best the variables behavioral ecologists study. In part, this movement for the studied neuron was required to look at reflects the current state of our neurobiological sophistithe oddball; otherwise, firing rates dropped back toward cation; both sensory systems and movement control baseline levels. Importantly, regardless of the rate of systems are far better understood than the systems increase in neuronal activity, the movement occurred at which assess the values, likelihoods, and profitabilities a roughly fixed interval after the firing rate reached a of outcomes. But as a result, many classical physiologispecific level. This led Schall to suggest the existence cal studies have almost entirely ignored the variables of a decisional threshold which the rising activity had behavioral ecologists identify as critical at the level of to cross in order for a movement to be produced. ultimate causation. If the vertebrate brain does repreEcological Studies of Decision Making sent the environmental variables that define strategies While these experiments do tell us something important for maximizing evolutionary fitness, then these more about the relationship between sensation and action in classical studies of sensory-to-motor connections may the primate nervous system, what is most striking to a only reveal the most superficial properties of the neural behavioral ecologist is that almost none of the variables architecture for decision making (Figure 1) . which guide decision making were manipulated in those In order to better understand how physiological studstudies. The values, costs, profitability, and likelihoods ies of decision making differ from ecological studies of of reward associated with stimulus and movement were decision making, consider the following set of landmark not varied; instead, all of those variables were held conexperiments by Jeffrey Schall and his colleagues (cf. stant under all conditions. As a result, to a behavioral Hanes and Schall, 1996; Schall and Thompson, 1999).
ecologist these experiments seem more about moveFor these experiments, thirsty rhesus monkeys were ment production than about decision making per se. hole, placed beneath a perch, which overlooked a black individual. Because some birds were able to strip the paper tape off more quickly than others, the profitability rubber conveyor belt sliding past the opening at a speed of the small worms varied significantly from individual of 5 inches per second. Out of sight of the bird, the to individual. Third, the experimenters systematically experimenters could place mealworms (a favorite food manipulated the frequency with which, in a given experiof titmice) on the belt, which would present the worms mental session, worms of each type were encountered. to the birds through the 2.5 inch hole for about 0.5 s.
In each session, large and small worms were placed on The birds had to decide whether to grab a worm as it the conveyor belt according to a predetermined pseudowent by or whether to wait for the next worm to appear. random sequence yielding a specific mean encounter In order to characterize the serial decision problem frequency for that prey type. Varying the encounter frethat the birds faced in terms of the classical prey selecquency was selected because under these circumtion model (Charnov, 1973; see Stephens and Krebs, stances the prey selection model makes a critical pre-1986, for a full treatment of the model), three classes of diction. It predicts that for a given bird the average rate variables were systematically manipulated in this study.
at which large worms are encountered should set a First, the caloric value of the mealworms was controlled. minimum threshold for profitability. Any prey that falls Worms were presented in two sizes which differed in beneath this threshold should never be selected, regardvalue by a factor of two. Second, the handling time (and less of the frequency with which it is encountered (cf. thus the cost) associated with each worm type was
Stephens and Krebs, 1986). measured for each individual bird and, in the case of When the experiment was run, the actual choices the small worms, was manipulated. This was accommade by each bird were well predicted by the prey plished by attaching pieces of paper tape to the small selection model. For birds who could strip the tape away worms, which the birds had to remove. By measuring quickly, the model predicted that the small worms the time it took each individual to handle and consume should always be above the threshold of profitability. both large and small worms, it was possible to determine For the birds that handled the small worms slowly, howthe relative profitability of the two worm types to each ever, the prey model made a different prediction. At one or more of the rates at which large worms were presented, each of these birds should have decided to select only the large worms and to ignore the small worms. What Krebs and his colleagues found was that the choice behavior of the birds did reveal the existence of this profitability threshold and at a level that was almost identical to the level predicted by the model. They also, however, observed one significant deviation of behavior from the model. Although the birds showed strong preferences for the large worms at the right times, they did not show an absolute preference. When they should have been ignoring the small worms completely, they were still sampling those worms about 10% of the time, a result which has been widely repeated but never 1997). Neurophysiological studies of decision making, however, have until recently almost completely ignored a reward than the left lever. Under these conditions, the animal should now switch to the right lever. these variables as tools for understanding the nervous system. Of course, the notion that optimum theories of
In the more general case, where the values of the reward produced by the two levers varies, foraging theothe type MacArthur and Pianka pioneered can be used to study the neural architecture for decision making is ries predict that response rates on each lever should be proportional to their relative profitabilities. If one of more a hypothesis for testing rather than anything certain. But a number of laboratories have begun to perform the two levers presents a standard reward and the other presents a reward that is varied across blocks of trials, those tests, and the results are encouraging.
Decision Variables and Neural Architectures
then it should be possible to determine the precise value of any physiological stimulation to the rat with regard C. Randy Gallistel and his colleagues have spent over 20 years studying the decisions rats make when they to a fixed standard by observing the fraction of time she budgets to each lever. work for brain stimulation reward, the direct electrical activation of neural structures like the medial forebrain When Gallistel and his colleagues examined this twolever variable interval schedule with self-stimulation as bundle (MFB) with surgically implanted electrodes (cf. Gallistel et al., 1981; Gallistel, 1994). Unlike ecological the reward, they were able to apply an economic-style analysis to the choices rats made in order to describe studies in which rewards are experienced through intact perceptual systems, experiments with brain stimulation the precise subjective profitability of any pattern of MFB activation. This allowed them to derive an equation dereward bypass at least some of the sensory component of standard sensory-motor decision making. These studfining the value of stimulation as a function of the current, frequency, and duration of MFB stimulation. Gallistel's ies therefore permit one to test the hypothesis that variables which serve as the ultimate causes of behavior results are critical because they were among the first to suggest that economic-style approaches could be can govern the decisions made by a reduced segment of the neural architecture, shifting the focus of the ecoused to study neurobiological phenomena. They show that economic approaches can be used to characterize nomic approach toward a study of the proximal causes of behavior. decision making not just at the level of the whole organism, but even when the sensory-perceptual systems by Gallistel's most recent work along these lines (cf. Leon and Gallistel, 1992; Mark and Gallistel, 1993, 1994) has which the animal assesses natural rewards are replaced by the direct electrical activation of an internal neural focused on the study of rats who must choose between two different patterns of stimulation. In those experistructure. If the approaches behavioral ecologists employ for studying the ultimate causes of behavior can ments, a rat is placed in a cage that contains two levers. If the rat depresses the right lever, the MFB is activated be used to study electrical stimulation of the MFB, can these approaches also be used in neurophysiological by a brief train of electrical pulses delivered at a fixed frequency and current. If the rat depresses the left lever, studies of decision making? To begin to answer that question, Platt and Glimcher the MFB is also activated but at a different frequency and current. The rat must decide between these two (1999) developed a neurophysiological experiment based loosely on foraging approaches like the ones options, allowing the experimenter to assess the relationship between the subjective value of the stimulation Krebs and Gallistel employed but in this case designed to examine the neural substrate for visual-saccadic deand the frequency and current of MFB activation. The only drawback to this approach toward understanding cision making in rhesus monkeys (Figure 4) . In that experiment, thirsty monkeys were trained to stare straight the value of MFB stimulation, however, is that one can only rank order the values of the left and right levers. ahead at a central visual stimulus. After a delay, two eccentric targets were illuminated, and the monkeys In order to overcome that limitation, Gallistel and his colleagues adjusted the dynamic structure of the rehad to choose whether to look at the left target, the right target, or to abort the trial. The critical manipulation wards in the standard two-lever choice task in order to extract, from the animal's behavior, a precise estimate was that on sequential blocks of 100 trials the amount of juice that the monkeys would earn for each of the of the exact value of any pattern of stimulation. To do this, they adopted a strategy first pioneered for the study leftward and rightward movements was systematically manipulated, and the animals' decisions about which of choice behavior in pigeons by Richard Herrnstein (1961), in which each of the rat's two levers was configmovement to make were recorded. Finally, while the monkeys made decisions under these varying condiured so that the likelihood it would release a stimulation train increased in proportion to the time since the lever tions, the activity of single neurons in parietal cortex was studied to test the hypothesis that the relative profitwas last pressed (a variable interval schedule). Under this regime, the left lever might, for example, become abilities of the leftward and rightward responses were being represented within the neural architecture itself. enabled with an additive probability of 0.5 per second, while the right lever might become enabled on any given
The posterior parietal cortex was selected for examination, at least in part, because it was a major source of second with a lower additive probability of 0.3. Importantly, once enabled, a lever remained enabled until the input to the frontal eye fields (FEF). At a theoretical level, the problem that the monkeys reward was harvested by the rat. In a configuration like this, during the first second of an experiment in which faced at the beginning of each block of 100 trials was first to determine the relative profitability of both rethe two levers yield rewards of equal value but with these different probabilities, the left lever is clearly more sponses. Once that had been accomplished, animals might be expected to adopt an efficient foraging stratprofitable, and the rats should respond on it exclusively. But after 3 s spent pressing the left lever, the right lever egy. They should, therefore, have produced each response several times at the beginning of a new block reaches a point at which it is now more likely to present controlled behavior in Fretwell's model of multi-animal foraging, but also with the actual moment-by-moment probability matching behavior of the animals in which these neurons resided. To a first approximation then, the neuronal data seemed to suggest that computations performed by the neural architecture for decision making were at least related to computations that should be the ultimate causes of decision-making behavior.
More recently, Gold and Shadlen (2000) have come to a similar conclusion in a study of activity in the FEF of monkeys during another kind of visual-saccadic decision-making task. In that experiment, monkeys were trained to stare at a field of chaotically moving spots of light. A small fraction of those spots, however, moved coherently in a single direction, either to the right or to the left. If the monkey reacted to this display by looking in the direction that the small fraction of coherently drifting spots were moving, he earned a juice reward. Gold and Shadlen (2001) applied a formal decision theoretic analysis to the problem the monkeys faced. They reasoned that when a large fraction of the spots were moving coherently the monkeys ought to be able to assess the likelihood that a rightward movement would be rewarded quite quickly. When only a tiny fraction of the dots were moving coherently, the monkeys ought to stare at the moving spots as long as possible to maximize the likelihood that they had correctly identified the more profitable movement. If the decision-making To test this hypothesis, Gold and Shadlen (2000) used electrical stimulation in the FEF to trigger a saccade at a variable interval after the moving spot display began. and then settled on a strategy of producing only the Under normal conditions, stimulation of the FEF elicits more profitable response. Instead, Platt and Glimcher a saccade having a fixed amplitude and direction, and found that the monkeys typically matched their rates of it was hoped that the temporal profile of the saccadic responding during each block to the relative profitability decision process would be revealed as a systematic of the two responses, as the rats had in Gallistel's experideviation in the endpoint of the stimulation-induced ments. In 1972, the behavioral ecologist Stephen Fretmovements. What they found was that the stimulationwell developed a model for foraging under these circuminduced movements were indeed systematically biased stances that might provide some insight into the ultimate and in a way that was correlated, at each point in time cause of this apparently suboptimal behavior. Fretwell during the decision-making interval, with the theoretinoted that whenever animals forage in groups and have cally derived estimate of the likelihood that a given to compete with each other for access to rewards of movement would be rewarded. Once again, the neurons different values, probability matching of this type is alseemed to be encoding a signal closely related to the ways an optimal strategy. This raised the possibility that variables that an economically based model indicated monkeys may probability match under many circumshould be the ultimate cause of the behavior. stances because the neural computations that they perSummary form reflect an evolutionary assumption that they are Over the course of the last several decades, behavioral competing with other monkeys.
ecologists have repeatedly demonstrated that animals In any case, while the animals were engaged in this often select between uncertain options of variable value matching behavior, the activity of neurons in the eye in ways that are highly efficient; evolution appears to movement control area of posterior parietal cortex was push animals toward efficient decision making within assessed. Neurons associated with rightward movetheir evolved niches. Behavioral ecologists have been ments were, under these circumstances, found to carry able to show that models of optimal decision making a signal which was highly correlated with the relative rooted in economic theory do a surprisingly good job profitability of the rightward movement. Similarly, neuof describing the computations that animals perform. rons associated with leftward movements seemed to More recently, neurobiologists have begun to approencode the relative profitability of the leftward movepriate this approach, using economic tools developed ment. Essentially, the ratio of these two activities was for studying the ultimate evolutionary causes of behavior for the examination of the neural architecture which correlated not only with the relative profitabilities that serves as the proximal cause of that behavior. The studducks in front of experimenter one realizes that it would be more profitable to switch to experimenter two. Of ies presented here and literally dozens of other closely related studies (see the other articles in this issue of course, if all of them switch to experimenter two, then any duck remaining in front of experimenter one will Neuron) have begun to suggest that the explicit computations modeled by behavioral ecologists can be disprofit enormously; as ducks shift toward experimenter two, their actions alter the profitability of standing in sected at a neuro-computational level.
In all of these cases, however, animals are decision front of experimenter one. Under these conditions, the dynamic interactions of the ducks influence profitability makers who must select and execute a rational course of action in a passive world. The world is conceived of as much as does the rate at which breadballs are thrown. What then is the optimal response under these condias presenting a fixed problem that the animal must solve. While clearly valuable, studies of this kind may fail to tions?
The modern solution to this class of problem was engage the richest and most complicated kind of decision making, the unpredictable or stochastic decisions developed by John Forbes Nash in the 1950s. Nash recognized that under conditions like these the populathat humans and animals make when faced with more complicated environmental situations. tion as a group could be viewed as a dynamic system which would ultimately reach a stable group solution, or equilibrium, when the expected value of each resource Dynamic Conditions: The Theory of Games patch was equivalent. The ducks would reach a group In the middle of the twentieth century, the mathematiequilibrium when and only when ten ducks stood before cian John Von Neumann and the economist Oskar Morexperimenter two and 20 ducks stood before experigenstern (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) bementer one, rendering the profitability of both patches came interested in understanding when and how 1.5 g/m/duck (Nash, 1950a (Nash, , 1950b ; for a derivation spestochastic behavior, behavior in which humans behave cifically with regard to foraging, see Fretwell, 1972). unpredictably, might be described as an efficient stratTo make Nash's insight clear, consider a case in which egy for maximizing wealth. Von Neumann recognized 21 ducks stand momentarily in front of experimenter that most economic problems which had been well deone and nine stand in front of experimenter two. The scribed at that time involved straightforward optimizapopulation will reach a stable point most efficiently (and tion of the kind foraging theorists would later study. In each duck will be guaranteed a maximal return assuming those problems, What McCabe and his colleagues found was that a dictable at a local level but maintained the Nash equilibtypical subject was very likely to cooperate with a human rium globally. opponent, even when she was told that she would face a Harper's experiment suggests that, even when anidifferent opponent on subsequent trials. Humans turned mals are dynamic and unpredictable, their behavior may out to be more cooperative with other humans than was still be described as the product of an evolutionary prostrictly rational, almost as if their brains were performing cess that optimizes decision making. Thus, even stoa computation that assumed this opponent would, chastic behavior may be ultimately caused by the envisooner or later, be encountered again. However, when ronmental constraints that drive evolution. Indeed, a subjects were told that they faced a computer opponent, growing number of other studies support this concluthey often took a different and more purely rational apsion. For example, Craig Packer and his colleagues (cf. proach. They almost never cooperated. What McCabe Packer and Ruttan, 1988; Packer et al., 1990) have and his colleagues found when studying the brains of shown that the strategic behavior of lions who compete their subjects under these conditions was that whenever within a pride can be well described using game theoa subject chose to cooperate with a human opponent retic approaches. Of course, the question that this raises a specific region in prefrontal cortex was more active is whether game theoretic approaches which define the than when they decided to act rationally against the ultimate causes of competitive and stochastic behavcomputer. While this does not tell us too much about ioral decisions can also be used to better understand how cooperativity is computed neurally, the McCabe the neural substrates that serve as the proximal causes experiment is an important first step because it demonof these unpredictable behaviors.
strates that game theoretic approaches can be used to used information theory to describe efficient sensory abstract) have begun to examine, using fMRI, the brains encoding. of pairs of humans engaged in strategic interactions. In
As neurobiologists begin to study the proximal causes those experiments, two humans in two fMRI scanners of decision making, it seems imperative that these ecoplay a game classically called matching pennies while nomic approaches to behavior be employed as tools to both are simultaneously scanned. These simultaneous bridge the gap between ultimate and proximal causes studies may soon provide insight into the moment-byof behavior. Just as the sensory physiologists of the last moment interplays of neural activity that characterize century used models that were specifically designed to stochastic decision making between pairs of subjects. describe efficient sensory encoding and discrimination, Summary neurophysiologists interested in decision making must In the 1950s and 60s, a number of neurophysiologists employ economic models specifically designed to debecame interested in understanding how the sensory scribe the decision-making process. If the success of systems of the brain encoded information about the the sensory physiologists during the last 50 years is any outside world. One approach to this problem was to indication, models of decision making rooted in ecoderive an estimate of how an optimally efficient sensory nomic theory should provide powerful insights into brain system would operate. Behavioral tests then sought to function over the next half century. determine the sensory efficiency of human and animal
